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ABSTRACT: In response to critique by Godden and Walton, this essay delineates the role of moral 
motivation in the commitment structure of ordinary presumptive inferences. It defends the capacity of 
ordinary presumptions to support discursive structures within which everyday argumentation can address 
defeasible claims and enable alignments and realignments in probative obligations, i.e., burdens of proof. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  
In a recent essay David Godden and Douglas Walton offer a framework for developing 
“A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation” (2007). In the course of their 
literature review they offer an assessment of the limits of “Kauffeld’s model of 
presumption.” In this paper I respond to their critique.  
My task is complicated by differences in our respective research orientations. 
Godden and Walton aspire to develop an explanation of presumption suited to a theory of 
argumentation (2007, p. 314). Accordingly, they ascribe theoretical pretensions to 
“Kauffeld’s model;” whereas, the research to which they refer is a more modest attempt 
to identify what we ordinarily are doing when we presume things and to explicate how 
presumptions figure in day-to-day argumentation. This attempt at analysis and explication 
is ultimately animated by theoretical interests, but it is methodologically situated in 
traditions of “ordinary language philosophy,” and it leans heavily on the pioneering work 
of J. L. Austin, G. J. Warnock, the non-theoretical aspects of H. P. Grice’s analysis of 
utterance-meaning, Dennis Stampe’s studies of speech acts and so on (Austin 1962; Grice 
1969; Stampe 1967; Warnock 1973). Work in this philosophical tradition focuses initially 
on the analysis of ordinary concepts and practices. In this respect Kauffeld’s study of 
presumption has an emic as contrasted with an entic orientation and is closely akin to 
work done by ethnomethodologists (Black 1980). When Godden and Walton evaluate 
“Kauffeld’s model of presumption,” the object of their criticism is neither a model nor a 
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contribution to a theory of presumption; it is simply a pre-theoretical articulation of 
ordinary concepts and practices. 
What, then, is the force of Godden and Walton’s critique? Are they challenging 
the adequacy of Kauffeld’s explication of our concept and practice of presuming things, 
or are they assessing the limits of those concepts and practices as bases for conducting 
day-to-day argumentation. They acknowledge that Kauffeld sees “his model” as 
describing […] the ordinary use of presumption, but they present no reason to suppose 
that Kauffeld has misrepresented the ways in which we ordinarily conceive presumptions 
and go about presuming.1 Supposing that their criticisms are well founded (a supposition 
challenged by the argument which follows) are we to conclude that my analysis is flawed 
or that our ordinary practices are limited or incoherent in some argumentatively 
significant respect? Since Godden and Walton provide no reason to suppose that I have 
misrepresented our ordinary practices, I propose to regard Godden and Walton’s 
criticisms of “Kauffeld’s model” as challenges to the capacity of ordinary presuming and 
presumption to support day-to-argumentation,2 and I will present my response as a 
defence of those plain practices.  
This approach bridges our respective research orientations. Godden and Walton’s 
critique has a solid “theoretical” base; it rightly supposes that any good account the role 
of presumption in day-to-day argumentation will have to deal with two aspects of 
persuasive arguments: (i) their defeasible nature and (ii) the ways in which presumptions 
figure both in the genesis and shifting of “burdens of proof.” Their criticism raises the 
question of whether our ordinary conception of presumption can support these aspects of 
persuasive argumentation. For reasons detailed elsewhere I hold that we should replace 
talk about “burden of proof” and “shifts” in such burdens with a terminology which 
represents this normative aspect of argumentation in terms of “probative obligations” and 
their “alignment/realignment” (Kauffeld, 2007a, pp. 72-73), but this terminological 
preference does not stand in the way of recognizing that Godden and Walton pose 
important challenges.  
In response, I will first attempt to clarify the nature and structure of ordinary 
presumptive inferences. I will then argue such inferences can accommodate the 
defeasible nature of claims advanced in day-to-day arguments, and (2) they afford 




                                                 
1 Of course I recognize that an analysis of our concept of presuming involves some idealization. Our 
practices and the world at large are often messier, more complicated and less clearly delineated than our 
concepts; moreover, our concepts are not always available to us in the stark clarity which they acquire 
under the bright light of careful analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to unpack the essential components of, 
e.g., our conception of ‘presuming’ and ‘presumption’ by semantic analysis of the cognate terms and, given 
the substantive supposition that we do sometime speak the truth when we use those terms, we can infer the 
minimally necessary components of pragmatically successful instances of presuming and presumption. 
Treating those instances as basic paradigms, we can then look for such order as obtains in the larger 
complex world of day-to-day practice. 
2 I speak of “ordinary acts of presuming” and their products, our “day-to-day presumptions,” as distinct 
from the technical conceptions of presumption enshrined in legal argumentation and terms of art inherited 
in traditions of rhetoric and dialectic. 
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2. THE COMMITMENT STRUCTURE OF ORDINARY PRESUMPTIONS  
 
Godden and Walton characterize my explication of presumption as an “expectation-based 
account.” They then argue that expectation-based accounts (and mine in particular) 
confuse presumption and prediction and, so, have severe limitations (2007, pp. 322-323). 
Their designation, however, misrepresents both my analysis and our ordinary conception 
of presumption. While our ordinary conception of and practice of presuming things does 
involve expectations, our day-to-day understanding of presumption is based on 
commitments, rights, entitlements, etc. which warrant those expectations. To presume 
that p, in the ordinary sense of the term is to infer that p on the supposition some agent 
has made, is making, or will make it the case that p, rather than risk criticism, retribution, 
etc. for failing to do so. Such inferences are founded on the commitments persons 
undertake, often openly and explicitly, and on the (corresponding) entitlements due 
others. The practical calculation animating presumptive inference supposes that A will be 
vulnerable to criticism should she fail to do x. Accordingly, I have argued, presumptions 
have the following structure: 
   
If Jones says that the game will begin at seven, we may presume that he has made a responsible 
effort to speak the truth in view of the risk he runs of resentment for failing to do so. Here what is 
presumed is the proposition that Jones is speaking truthfully. Derivatively we may also presume 
that the game will start at seven. (2003, emphasis newly supplied) 
 
Presumptions rest on the efficacy of what T. M. Scanlon describes as “moral 
motivation.” 
 
When I reflect on the reason that the wrongness of an action seems to supply not to do it, the best 
description of this reason I can come up with has to do with the relation to others that such acts 
would put me in: the sense that others could reasonably object to what I do (whether or not they 
would actually do so) […] (T)he ideal of justifiability to others plays a large enough role in our 
practical reasoning to enable it to account for the complexities of “moral motivation.” […] Being 
moral in the sense of “ the morality of right and wrong” involves not just being moved to avoid 
certain actions “because they would be wrong,” but also being moved by more concrete 
considerations such as “she’s counting on me” or “he needs my help” or “doing that would put 
them in danger.  (Scanlon 1998, pp. 155-156).  
 
The practical calculations which, according to Scanlon, provide an agent with moral 
motivation can also figure into the calculations of others who may be in some co-
dependent relationship with that agent. On the supposition that a morally motivated agent 
would not act in a way that would provide others with reasonable (and perhaps 
unanswerable) basis for objection, criticism, resentment, reprobation, etc., those others 
may reasonably infer that in this particular case the agent is acting responsibly, truthfully, 
dutifully, and so on. We ordinarily identify such suppositions based on an agent’s 
commitments as “presumptions.” Given such suppositions we commonly take a second 
inferential step and presume, e. g., that the agent will return the tool she has borrowed, 
that her statement is true, that she is providing appropriate care for her aging parents, and 
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so on. Commitments provide the basis for presumptive inferences; such inferences 
commonly issue in expectations.3 
 Whatever its merits, this analysis does not represent presumptions as 
“expectation-based;” rather it shows ordinary acts of presuming to be based on 
obligations, entitlements, and the risk of resentment which accompanies such 
commitments. It would properly be referred to as a “commitment-based” account. 
Ordinary acts of presuming may well (often do) conclude in expectations. However, to 
designate such acts of inferring as “expectation-based” misleadingly identifies their 
structure by focusing on the conclusion to such inferences and directs our attention away 
from what warrants presumptions. Persistent preoccupation with features of the 
conclusion to presumptive inference has long obscured its underlying structure (Kauffeld, 
2003). 
 
3. CAN ORDINARY COMMITMENT-BASED PRESUMPTIONS SUPPORT 
ARGUMENTATION ADDRESSED TO DEFEASIBLE CLAIMS? 
 
Our understanding of defeasible reasons, claims, inferences comes from reflection on 
legal argumentation. H. L. A. Hart explains the defeasible structure of legal arguments; in 
terms of the challenges which be mounted against their claims. 
 
For the accusations or claims upon which law courts adjudicate can usually be challenged or 
opposed in two ways. First, by a denial of the facts upon which they are based […] and second by 
something quite different, namely, a plea that although all the circumstance on which a claim 
could succeed are present, yet in the particular case, the claim or accusation should not succeed 
because other circumstances are present which brings the case under some recognized head of 
exception, the effect of which is either to defeat the claim or accusation altogether or to ‘reduce’ it 
so that only a weaker claim can be sustained. (Hart 1965, p. 154) 
  
Defeasibility is a property of a variety of propositions regarding human action, including 
claims about responsibility and culpability, claims about what should or will be done in 
future situations, and claims about the respect due to achievements (Geach 1966; Hart 
1965; Kenny  1966). 
Godden and Walton maintain that commitment-based (expectation-based) views 
of presumption cannot accommodate the defeasible nature of claims advanced in day-to-
day argumentation. By implication such presumptions could not support the ordinary 
defeasible argumentation. This is a serious charge. If ordinary presuming and 
presumption have the alleged limitations, then either some reform of ordinary practice 
would seem to be in order or Kauffeld has not adequately explicated what we plainly do 
when we presume things.  
                                                 
3 I have defended this analysis of presumption at length elsewhere (1995, 2003). The conditions it posits as 
essential to presuming can be seen on analytical grounds to be necessary and sufficient to identifying 
ordinary acts of presuming and their products, presumptions. The analysis also enables us to distinguish 
between presumption and their near relative, assumptions. And the analysis affords insight into the 
pragmatics of such argumentatively significant communicative acts as proposing, accusing, advising, 
answering criticism, and so on. Given these merits, this analysis provides grounds for claiming that 
achieves what it purports to represent, i. e., the essential components of ordinary acts of presuming. It may, 
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 Their critique starts from the case of the lazy soldier. 
   
Consider the case where it is a soldier’s duty to raise the flag at dawn, but he is very unreliable and 
tends to sleep in. Consider now our presumption (as Kauffeld would have us talk of it) that p: the 
soldier will raise the flag at dawn. In one sense, the presumption that p does not disappear in the 
face of evidence that the social bonds obliging the soldier to bring it about that p will not be met. 
We are still entitled to presume (in the normative sense) that p, even though it is not likely to 
happen. In such a circumstance, it is quite sensible to say that while I still presume that p, I do not 
take it to be so. (In a similar way, I could say that I still expect something of the soldier, even 
though I do not have any expectation about the state of the flag at dawn.) So, while we might be 
entitled to presume, we would no longer be justified in doing so. (2007, p. 323) 
  
From this case Godden and Walton conclude: 
 
[…] [O]n Kauffeld’s model, unjustified presumptions retain their presumptive status. The fact that 
a person is not likely to do something does not change the fact that he ought to. And since it is 
these obligations that underwrite Kauffeld’s presumptions, they do not disappear in the face of 
empirical evidence against their being fulfilled—indeed, they do not even seem to be responsive to 
contrary evidence of this sort. Because they are based primarily on social obligations, expectation 
based presumptions are not defeasible in the right sorts of ways. (p. 323 ) 
 
As we consider this argument and its supporting example, it will be useful to 
follow a suggestion offered by Godden and Walton later in their essay and to recognize a 
distinction, drawn by Hans Hansen, between the presumed status of a proposition and the 
proposition presumed (Godden & Walton 2007, p. 340; Hansen 2003). In the example of 
the lazy soldier the presumed status of the proposition is that one is entitled to expect that 
the Smith (the soldier) will raise the flag; the proposition presumed is that Smith will 
raise the flag. This is a useful distinction; however, it focuses exclusively on the 
conclusion to (the claim advanced by) a presumptive inference and neglects the grounds 
and warrants for such inferences. We also need to consider whether the inferential 
structure for the presumption is defeasible: let us say that we have been told by Smith’s 
commander that she is going to assign Smith the duty of raising the flag. Given that 
Smith has this obligation, we have reason to believe that he risks sure reprobation and 
punishment should he fail to raise the flag. This supposition warrants the belief that Smith 
has adequate moral motivation to raise the flag. Accordingly, we may presume that Smith 
will act responsibly, i.e. that he will obey the command and raise the flag. By this route 
we may come to presume that Smith will make it the case that the flag is raised. In what 
respects is this chain of inferences defeasible? 
As a first attempt to answer this question consider some variants on the case of the 
soldier and the flag. The conversation in each variant begins: 
 
A says, ‘I presume that Smith will raise the flag.’ 
B asks, ‘On what grounds?’ 
A responds, ‘His commander told me that she is going to assign Smith the duty of 
raising the flag.’ 
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B respondsa, ‘Don’t be so sure about that. Smith is notoriously lazy and discipline 
on this base is very lax.’ 
A answersb, ‘Well something should be done about that.’ 
Case A2 
B respondsa, ‘Don’t count on that. Smith is a belligerent type; he would rather 
scrub the toilets than accede to his commander’s orders.’ 
A respondsb, ‘His commander will take care of that.’ 
 
These episodes are expanded versions of Godden and Walton’s case of the lazy soldier. 
In both, B’s responses challenge the presumption that Smith will act responsibly and 
make it the case that he has raised the flag. In each case we might continue to presume 
that Smith will raise the flag and are entitled to that presumption, even though we may 
have observationally based knowledge warranting belief that Smith will not. We would 
not regard the proposition presumed as a reliable prediction. 
 
Type B situations 
 
Case B1 
B respondsa, ‘However that may be, the flags have been stolen.’ 
A asksb, ‘Does Smith’s commander know that?’ 
Case B2 
B respondsa, ‘Don’t so sure. Smith has acute narcolepsy.’ 
A respondsb, ‘Does Smith commander know that?’ 
 
In these cases B’s responses challenge the supposition that the commander’s order creates 
an obligation binding on Smith which requires that he raise the flag. In both cases such an 
obligation would require Smith to do what he cannot do. Accordingly, he does not risk 
serious criticism and reprobation for failing to raise the flag; at the very least Smith 
would have a reasonable excuse for not raising the flag.  The situation is not one in which 
he would have efficacious moral motivation. Here B’s objections defeat the presumption 
that acting responsibly requires Smith to raise the flag. And also defeat the proposition 
that Smith will raise the flag. 
 
Type C situations 
 
Case C1 
B respondsa ‘Don’t count on that. Smith’s commander has been on a bender and 
has failed to post his orders.’ 
A observesb, ‘Then Smith could not know he is supposed to raise the flag.’ 
Case C2 
B respondsa, ‘You cannot believe that; Smith’s commander is a notorious liar.’ 
A answersb ‘Poor Smith.’ 
 
In these cases B’s responses challenge the grounds on which the presumption rests. They 
deny that what Smith’s commander told A is a reliable basis for A’s inferences. These 
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challenges overturn (or substantially weaken) both the presumptive status of the 
proposition and its predictive value. Suppose that the conversation in C1 goes as follows: 
 
A says: ‘Thank god, the flag will be raised tomorrow; Smith has been assigned the 
job, and he is very responsible.’ 
 
B: responds: ‘Don’t be so sure, his commanding officer has gone on a bender and 
has failed to post Smith’s assignment.’ 
 
A. ‘My goodness! Does Smith know?’ 
 
Taken together these cases show (i) that the inferences ordinarily supporting a 
proposition’s presumptive status are thoroughly defeasible and (ii) that challenges to the 
presumptive status of a proposition in type B and type C cases also call into question the 
predictive acceptability of the presumed proposition. So, the claim that ordinary 
commitment based presumptions are not defeasible with respect to empirical evidence is 
not supported by appropriate elaboration of the case supporting Godden and Walton’s 
claim.  
Consider now the other component in their claim, viz., that should commitment 
based presumptions turn out to be defeasible, then they are not defeasible in the right sort 
of way,  i.e., in a way related to how such inferences can be managed in epistemically 
significant argumentation. Response to this claim requires further reflection on Type A 
situations.  
It may seem odd that grounds which entitle A to expect that the Smith will raise 
the flag warrant that entitlement and also give A compelling reason to suppose Smith will 
not live up to his responsibilities and raise the flag. Situations with this peculiar duality 
are common and call for explanation. A teacher, for example, might say to her class, 
“Your papers are due tomorrow, and I presume that you will all have them in on time,” 
knowing full well that several members of the class routinely turn their papers in late. Her 
notification may nevertheless be both sound and useful. It puts the class on notice and 
warrants her application of sanctions to tardy papers. G. E. M. Anscombe’s account of 
knowledge of and related to intentional act casts clarifying light on what seems to be the 
oddity in these commonly occurring cases. 
Anscombe shows that this duality in which the acceptability of a presumed 
proposition can be evaluated from two distinct orientations is inherent in our knowledge 
of intentional acts and in our ordinary reasoning and arguing about human conduct. We 
are commonly justified in accepting propositions regarding human acts which are from a 
predictive point of view false; in such cases, as G. E. Anscombe has shown, the error lies 
in action itself not in our intentional knowledge of that act. 
 
Let us consider a man going round town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that the 
relation of this list to the thing he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the 
list or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation when a list is made by a detective 
following him about. If he made the list himself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave 
it him, it has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens, in the order 
and the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things 
that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the 
mistake is not in the list but in the man’s performance (if his wife were to say: ‘Look, it says butter 
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and you have bought margarine,’ he would hardly reply: ‘What a mistake! We must put that right’ 
and alter the word on the list to ‘margarine’); whereas if the detective’s record and what the man 
actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record. (p. 56) 
 
Although the cases involving our flag-raising soldier are more complicated, their parallels 
to Anscombe’s example are enlightening.  
Where circumstances stand to defeat a presumptive claim, we may treat the 
conclusion to the inference in ways which are analogous to a defect in the observation-
based list drawn up by Anscombe’s detective. We may, that is, correct the presumed 
conclusion. Or we (and in many cases this would be the more important option) can 
attempt to correct the circumstances which challenge the presumptive status of the 
conclusion. Thus in C1 above, we might set out to find Smith and tell him that his 
commander has assigned him flag raising duty, thus obviating the possibility that a hung-
over commander would upbraid Smith for failing to raise the flag. Or in B1 above, we 
might notify the commander (or other appropriate officer) that the flags have been stolen 
so that the situation can be corrected and Smith can get the flag up. And in situations A1 
and A2 Smith’s commander may take steps to correct the situation. This she can do in 
various ways. The commander can assign the lazy soldier some obnoxious core (cleaning 
the latrines) as a penalty for failing to raise the flag and can make it clear that even stiffer 
penalties will follow repetition of that failure. And/or the commander can make certain 
the lazy soldier knows that the commander will be in a position to recognize any failure 
the soldier might make regarding his flag-raising duties, e.g., the commander might 
assign a more responsible soldier the task of overseeing the lazy soldier’s execution of his 
flag waving duties, or the commander might require that the lazy soldier report directly to 
the commander prior to raising the flag. Or the commander might toss the lazy soldier in 
the brig and, having made an example of him, assign another soldier the duty of raising 
the flag. Many such steps could be taken to correct the soldier’s estimate of the risk of 
resentment, punishment, etc. that he runs should he fail to raise the flag and/or the risk 
related calculation of the soldier’s comrades. Thus, we have cases in which we adhere to 
the presumed status of a presumptive conclusion as part of a larger effort to correct the 
circumstances which weaken the moral motivation on which that inference rests. 
  We have seen cases in which a presumptive inference is weakened or 
strengthened by variation in the circumstances entering an agent’s calculation of the risk 
of resentment he would run were he to fail to act in accord with the commitments 
warranting the presumption—cases in which circumstances effect the moral motivation 
on which the presumption rests. These cases point to a general potential for strengthening 
or weakening ordinary presumptions. For example, if we have reason to doubt whether a 
borrower will return the item he borrows simply in view of the resentment we would 
express should he fail to do so, we may up the cost of failure by requiring a deposit, or we 
may enhance the certainty that such failure will recognized by conspicuously inscribing 
our name on the object borrowed, or we may remind the borrower that the last party who 
failed to return an item borrowed from us spent a fortnight in jail. On the other hand we 
may seriously weaken the presumption that the borrowed item will be promptly returned 
by giving the borrower to believe that we rarely, if ever, have use for the borrowed object 
and, so, are not seriously concerned about its timely return. In general presumptive 
inferences can be strengthened or weakened by modifying considerations relevant to the 
primary calculations of risk on which the presumed inference is based. 
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This potential for strengthening presumptions by modifying the conditions which 
affect an agent’s calculation of his risk of resentment is realized in a large class of 
inferences which I have called “special presumptions.” Members of this class figure very 
importantly in ordinary argumentation.  
Special presumptions are engaged by strategies in which an agent explicitly 
modifies the basis for an agent’s risk-related calculations in order to induce others to 
attribute to that agent moral motivation upon which they can rely. Special presumptions 
can be engaged in such speech acts as proposing, accusing, answering criticism, etc. 
These speech acts have in common the feature that the speaker openly incurs a 
obligation to answer questions related to some proposition the speaker wants her 
addressees to consider and/or adopt. By openly incurring that probative obligation the 
speaker manifestly vacates the possibility that she could deny or evade responsibility for 
answering questions, objections, etc. Accordingly, she strategically modifies the risk 
related calculation which she can reasonably expect others to attribute to her and, thereby, 
strengthens the presumption that she has something to say which will be worth her 
addressees’ time and attention. Employing this strategy, a speaker advancing a defeasible 
proposition can create a context in others are warranted in considering that proposition.  
We can see this possibility realized in King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”  
Here King openly speaks with the intention of answering criticisms from white clergy 
directed against his protest activities on behalf of civil rights (Kauffeld 2007b; King 
2003, p. 777). The initial distribution of presumptions assumed by King can be 
reconstructed along these lines. King addresses answers to his clerical critics and 
ultimately to white moderates. Both King and his addressees presume that black citizens 
and white citizens should ultimately have equal civil rights, and both presume that black 
citizens have a right to work toward a world in which that equality is realized; 
accordingly, it might be presumed that black citizens have a right to vigorously assert 
those rights through what King calls “direct action” (sit-ins, protest marches, boycotts, 
etc.). The critical clergymen treat this presumption as defeasible and challenge it on 
several grounds, which King characterizes as claiming that King’s protest activities are 
“unwise and untimely.”  King openly accepts an obligation to answer those challenges in 
terms that are “patient and reasonable.” His commitment warrants a presumption to the 
effect that his answers deserve careful consideration. The case is a clear example of the 
capacity of ordinary presumption to support epistemically significant argumentation 
involving defeasible propositions. 
 
4. CAN ORDINARY COMMITMENT-BASED PRESUMPTIONS FACILITATE THE 
GENESIS AND REALIGNMENT OF PROBATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN DAY-TO-
DAY ARGUMENTATION? 
 
Godden and Walton would us have accept a negative answer to this question. They claim 
that commitment-based conceptions of presuming cannot elucidate shifts in the “burden 
of proof.” By implication this claim suggests that corresponding practices of presuming 
cannot afford the connections between presumptions and probative obligations necessary 
to the (competent) conduct of day-to-day argumentation. 
  
[…] although Kauffeld claims that his expectation-based model [commitment-based] does not 
decouple the ideas presumption and burden of proof, it is not clear that an expectation-based 
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model retains a picture of presumption where the effects are explained in terms of burden of proof. 
Rather, they seem to be explained in terms of obligations and entitlements, so if there are any 
argumentative devices that function to reverse the burden of proof this will require a good theory 
of these things, and the expectation based account cannot provide it. (2007, pp. 322-323 
parenthetical elaboration and italics added) 
   
This challenge raises complex questions, which ramify well beyond the scope of 
the present essay. We can, however, see that Godden and Walton do not provide adequate 
reason to doubt the capacity of ordinary presumption to support argumentative significant 
alignments in probative obligations. In the first place their conception of the 
pragmatically interesting relationship between presumptions and probative obligations 
underestimates the relevant resources ordinarily available in day-to-day argumentation; in 
the second place they do not take into account critically important ways in which 
probative obligation can be aligned and realigned in competent ordinary argumentation. 
Godden and Walton suggest that a “good theory” of “any argumentative devices 
that function to reverse the burden of proof”  must “retain a picture of presumption where 
effects are explained in terms of burden of proof”(2007, p. 323). It is not entirely clear 
what this requirement entails, but it seems reasonable to suppose that Godden and Walton 
have in mind something on the order of a Whatelian conception in which the existence of 
a presumption favouring a proposition (p) results in or has the effect of placing a “burden 
of proof” on parties who do not accept p. Explication of ordinary speech acts in which 
probative obligations are incurred relative to presumptions and critical analysis of 
argumentative discourse in which probative obligations are undertaken and/or generated 
reveal an array of relationships more complex the familiar Whatelian picture suggests. 
 Some standing presumptions, similar to the presumption of innocence in law, fit 
Godden and Walton’s picture.4 However, the special presumptions discussed above do 
                                                 
4 Standing presumptions are generally available to arguers, given an appropriate set of conditions. Given a 
standing presumption of innocence established by the rules for legal pleading, whenever a party in law is 
charged with criminal wrong-doing that party is to be presumed innocent with the “effect” that the party 
bringing the charge has the “burden of proof.” We do commonly recognize standing presumptions on a 
day-to-day basis. As a matter of the respect due persons we routinely presume enlightened self-reliance and 
self-concern on the part of others, i.e., when it comes to determination which effect another’s interests, we 
presume that she will act primarily on the basis of her own thought and experience, and we ordinarily 
presume that a person will give due thought and attention to her concerns. One possible consequence of 
these standing presumptions is that they may figure in the practical calculations which lead speakers to 
openly incur burdens of proof. I would not pretend to comprehend the various ways in which standing 
presumptions figure into our practical calculation, but an immediately interesting potential is the role 
standing presumptions can play in the calculations which can lead a speaker to openly incur a probative 
obligation. This potential is apparent in paradigm cases of proposing and difficult cases of advising. 
Proposals are typically made where S wants A to consider some proposition p, which A regards or is likely 
to regard as not in A’s interests. In these circumstances, S needs prudently to presume the A will rely 
primarily on his own thought and experience and, so, will not be inclined to consider p. In these 
circumstances S may be able to induce A to at least tentatively consider what S has to say on behalf of her 
proposal by openly incurring a corresponding probative burden (Kauffeld 1998). Here we might be inclined 
to say that the effects of a presumption include a burden of proof, but it would be more accurate to say that 
here a standing presumption figures prominently in the practical calculations which lead a proposer to 
undertake a probative obligation. It certainly is not the case that here a presumption necessarily, inevitably, 
or even typically results in an arguer’s incurring a “burden of proof.”   If the proposition S puts forward for 
A’s consider appeared to A to be his interest or to serve his interest, presuming self-reliance on A’s part 
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not. In making a proposal, for example, a speaker openly speaks with the intention of 
answering her addressee’s doubts, questions, objections, etc. In doing so she manifestly 
risks criticism for wasting her addressee’s time and attention should she not be prepared 
to satisfactorily answer the addressee’s questions. She can thereby engage a special 
presumption that her proposal merits (tentative) consideration (Kauffeld 1998, 2003). In 
this type of case the speaker’s manifest acceptance of a “burden of proof” results in a 
strategically engaged special presumption which, in favourable circumstances, may 
induce reluctant addressees to engage in a dialogue with the speaker. Here we see a 
relationship between presumptions and “burdens of proof” which is something like the 
reverse of the relationship which Godden and Walton seem to suppose is necessary to 
explaining how probative obligations can be realigned (burdens of proof can shift). 
When we attend critically to competent argumentation in which special 
presumptions are strategically generated by openly undertaking probative obligations, we 
gain insight into how discharging such obligations can result in a realignment of 
presumptions and probative obligations. The alignment and realignment of probative 
obligations in Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” provide a 
convenient example.5 
King’s letter falls into two parts. In the first part he openly incurs and 
conspicuously discharges an obligation to the answer criticisms directed against him by 
fellow clergymen (pp. 777-784). This section of King’s discourse provides a carefully 
reasoned body of argument which persuasively vindicates the protest activity for which 
he had been criticized and which very plausibly defends his status as patient, sincere and 
well intentioned Christian minister—a fellow clergyman. This discourse is patently 
designed to discharge his initial, self imposed probative obligation, i.e., to provide a 
patient and reasonable response to his critics, which shows his actions to be timely and 
wise and which merits careful consideration from sincere persons of good faith. Having 
presumptively discharged his initial probative obligation, the second part of King’s letter 
expresses his disappointment with the failure of his white ministerial brothers, and of 
“moderates” in general, to support non-violent protest activities on the behalf of Black 
civil rights (2003, pp. 784-794). The overall structure of his appeal repeats this form: 
King expresses his disappointment at the failure of the white clergy to support this or that 
aspect of Black demands for and direct action on behalf of their civil rights. He purports 
to have expected that white ministers and moderates would support these actions as a 
matter of their avowal of Christian doctrines, their commitment to democratic principles, 
and their enlightened cultural heritage. Having presumptively established his status as a 
patient and reasonable man of good faith, King uses that status as platform from which to 
impose an obligation on his fellow clergy and white moderates to answer for their failure 
to support his cause. He is suffering harm in the form of profound disappointment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not lead S to undertake a probative obligation. On the contrary S might here reasonably expect A to 
happily take up consideration of p. In this event S need not propose p; she might merely suggest that p. 
5I presented a critical analysis of this Letter at the last Alta Conference on Argumentation (2007). A 
similar, if more complicated alignment and realignment of probative obligations can be traced in the 
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resulting from that failure on their part to fulfill expectations, which they as professed 
Christian leaders had aroused in King’s breast.6   
This case shows that where a speaker openly incurs a probative obligation and 
proceeds by means of her argumentation to (conspicuously) discharge that burden, she 
may in turn be in a position to impose on her addressee an obligation to carefully 
consider her arguments and either accept them or undertake a probative obligation to 
defend their rejection.7  This is one of the ways in which probative obligations can be 




I have been responding to criticism directed to my analysis of ordinary presumptions and 
explication of their pragmatic value in day-to-day arguments. My response has taken the 
form of a defence of plain presumptions as part of the structure of obligations within 
which we ordinarily conduct arguments. 
I have maintained that ordinary presumptions are based on commitments. My 
argument in that connection calls attention inferential structure of presuming as 
contrasted with views which focus exclusively on features of a presumptive conclusion or 
claim. In defence of the pragmatic contribution ordinary presumptions make to day-to-
day arguments, I have tried to show that presumptive inferences are thoroughly defeasible 
and that by openly undertaking probative obligations arguers can generate a structure of 
special presumptions within which they can defend and challenge epistemically important 
defeasible claims. Underlying this line of defence is an important feature of 
presumptions, viz. that they can be strengthen or weakened by modifying the 
circumstances which generate relevant moral motivation. Finally, I have attempted to 
show that day-to-day special presumptions enable discursive structures within which 
probative obligations can be incurred and can be realigned.  
The issues raised by Godden and Walton’s critique go to the heart of the 
pragmatic value of presumption in the macro-structure of argumentation. Their critique 
opens a window for fuller consider of these topics. My response provides some first steps 
toward an account of how plain presumptions enable arguers to manage defeasible 
propositions. I hope that they are good first steps. They do, I submit, introduce 
                                                 
6 My account of the realignment of probative obligations in this case relies on an analysis of obligations 
provided by:  (Warnock 1971, pp. 94-117) . 
7 It might objected that Godden and Walton provide fundamentally correct picture about the relationship 
between presumptions and shift in the burden of proof as exemplify by King’s “Letter,” in that 
presumptions generated by King’s discharging his initial “burden of proof” do ultimately result in his 
attempt to impose a corresponding probative obligation on his critics and white moderates. I do not think 
this objection saves Godden and Walton criticism. They rather explicitly claim that commitment-based 
presumptions (in their terms, expectation-based presumptions), relying on obligations and entitlements 
cannot provide an account of “argumentative devices that function to reverse the burden of proof” (2007 p. 
323). I submit that King’s “Letter” and similar cases show that realignments in probative obligations can be 
achieved on the basis of “obligations and entitlements.”  Moreover, the realignment of probative 
obligations effected by King’s “Letter” is not a  simple and direct shift in the burden of proof (the “effects” 
of the presumptions established by King’s argument cannot simply be explained in terms of the burden of 
proof); rather the presumptions King establishes by discharging his initial probative obligations put him in 
a position to demand that his addressees carefully consider his arguments and accept his conclusions or 
accept an obligation to justify their rejection.  
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considerations which need to be taken into account as we move toward a “robust theory” 
of presumptions in everyday argumentation.  
  
DEDICATION: I should like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Peter Houtlosser, 
whose scholarly presence and wry smile will be sorely missed at this year’s OSSA 
gathering and at all foreseeable meetings of argumentation scholars. 
 




Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard University. 
Black, E. (1980). A note on theory and practice in rhetorical criticism. Western Journal of Speech 
Communication 44, 331-336. 
Geach, P. T. (1966). Dr. Kenny on practical inference. Analysis 26(3), 76-78. 
Godden, D. M., & D. Walton (2007). A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics and 
Cognition 15(2), 313-346. 
Grice, H. P. (1969). Utterer's meaning and intention. Philosophical Review, 78, 147-177. 
Hansen, H. V. (2003). Theories of presumptions and burdens of proof. In: J. A. Blair, D. Farr, H. V. 
Hansen, R. H. Johnson & C. W. Tindale (Eds.), Informal Logic at 25: Proceeding of the Windsor 
conference, Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Hart, H. L. A. (1965). The Ascription of responsibility and rights. In: A. Flew (Ed.), Logic and Language, 
Garden City: Anchor Books. 
Kauffeld, F. J. (1998). Presumption and the distribution of argumentative burdens in acts of proposing and 
accusing. Argumentation, 12(2), 245-266. 
Kauffeld, F. J. (2002). Pivotal issues and norms in rhetorical theories of argumentation. In: F. H. van 
Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and Rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation 
analysis (pp. 97-119), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Kauffeld, F. J. (2003). The ordinary practice of presuming and presumption with special attention to 
veracity and the burden of proof. In: F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard & A. F. S. 
Henkemans (Eds.), Anyone Who Has a View: Theoretical contributions to the study of 
argumentation (pp. 133-147), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
Kauffeld, F. J. (2007). The burden of proof: A macro or micro level concept? In: H. V. Hansen & R. C. 
Pinto (Eds.), Reason reclaimed (pp. 65-74), Newport News: Vale Press. 
Kenny, A. J. (1966). Practical inference. Analysis, 26(January), 65-75. 
King, M. L. J. (2003). Letter from Brmingham jail. In: Reporting Civil Rights, Part One: American 
journalism 1941-1963 (pp. 777-794), New York: The Library of America. 
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Stampe, D. (1967). On the Acoustic Behavior of Rational Animals. University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 
Warnock, G. J. (1971). The object of morality. London: Methuen and Co. 
Warnock, G. J. (1973). Some types of performative utterance. In: Essays on J. L. Austin (pp. 69-90), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
 
